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I. Introduction
Economists often make the distinction between
innovation and invention. Innovation involves a multifaceted
effort: the discovery, development, improvement and
commercialization of new processes and products. Innovation
therefore differs from invention.1 It includes not only the initial
discovery or the creation of potential new products or processes,
but also their subsequent development and commercialization. 2
Since Schumpeter, the consensus among economists is that
innovation is the most important factor in the growth of the
economy.3 The patent system, whose principal purpose is to
promote innovation by giving incentives to inventors, is a
prominent method that society utilizes to encourage innovation.
This policy goal is rooted in the original Constitutional
language that provides for legislation "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."4 In this way, the Constitution does
* Professor, Indiana University, Mauer School of Law
1. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 263, (Belknap Press 1985) (1982) (critiquing neoclassical
economics and analyzing firm dynamics and technological change).
2. See id. This distinction is attributed to Joseph Schumpeter. Id at 39-40.
3. See generally NELSON & WINTER supra note 1, at 263 (discussing innova-
tion as factor in economic growth).
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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more than empower Congress to grant patents, it grants that
power specifically to promote the progress of science.5 When
viewed from its 150 year existence, the goal expressed in the
Constitutional provision has come to fruition.6 Despite a dearth of
empirical support for the patent system,7 the consensus remains
that in certain industries, it has played a positive role in the
evolution of the United States becoming the paramount
technological innovator in the world.8
Today, however, the patent system is viewed with
increasing skepticism and scholarly literature is unsparing in
pointing out its deficiencies.9 Many commentators view the
patent system as a hindrance rather than a stimulus to
innovation. 10  The criticism follows a familiar pattern.11  An
increase in patent applications and weakened standards for
examining patents has led to a dramatic increase in the number
of patents granted in the U.S., roughly tripling between 1983 and
2002.12 During this same period, the Court of Appeals for the
5. See id.
6. See Josh Lerner, The Economics of Technology and Innovation: 150 Years
of Patent Protection 221-224 (2002) (exploring the economic strength, politi-
cal conditions and legal traditions surrounding the one hundred and fifty year
period of patents).
7. See Sir Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inven-
tions, in SELECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 35, 47 (1974) (discussing the
economic effects of allowing intellectual property rights); see also JOHN PALMER,
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, 3-4
(John P. Palmer & Richard 0. Zebe, Jr. eds., 1986).
8. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Patent Protection: Policy Implica-
tions from the Literature, Oct 30, 2003, archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5fuRx2 fyH.
9. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 1-25 (2008) (analyzing the
current breakdown of patents and surge in litigation).
10. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 6, 50 (2004) see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 9, at 5 9. "By
the late 1990's, the costs that patents imposed on public firms outweighed the
benefits." Id.
11. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 10, at 6.
12. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 10, at 6.
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Federal Circuit (CAFC) made it easier to enforce the rights
conferred by the acquisition of a patent and has extended those
rights by doctrines such as the doctrine of equivalents. 13 It is
hardly surprising that patent litigation has swelled, nurtured by a
progressive escalation in monetary awards.1 4 Single company
acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents-patent
thickets 15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a
company must hack its way through in order to commercialize
new technology.1 6 As the number of issued patents skyrocket,
companies more frequently enter into arrangements with
competitors "not only to recover their investment from creating
patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that
line the path of innovation."17 Companies strategically use patent
litigation as a means to protect their competitive position.18 Even
though a company might believe that it is not infringing, it is
often better to settle than fight.19  The risk of liability is
13. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17,
21 (1997). Under the doctrine of equivalents, "a product or process that does
not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless
be found to infringe if there is "equivalence" between the elements of the ac-
cused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.
See id. at 21 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
609 (1950)).
14. See Joseph P. Cook, On Understanding the Increase in U.S. Patent Litiga-
tion, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 48,48-49, (2007) (explaining favorable court out-
comes factor into increased patent litigation).
15. Proctor & Gamble, Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 406,
414 (D. Del. 1998). The term "patent thicket" first appeared in this case. Id at
414, n.6.
16. See id.
17. Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tri-
partite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (2003) (analyzing the paradox
between patent law and antitrust law).
18. See Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent
Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Liti-
gation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.I.289, 289-90 (2008) (discussing when corporations use
patents not to market an invention or process, but merely to engage in patent
litigation).
19. See Bob Sullivan, Patent Piracy, or Goliath's Comeuppance? Small Firms
Often Targeted in Obscure Infringement Cases, MSNBC, Apr. 30, 2004, archived
at http://www.webcitation.org/5fuSL0mIp (discussing patent litigation be-
tween large corporations and small companies).
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particularly harsh on small firms who are forced to accept license
agreements and pay compensation for past royalties because
they are unable to finance litigation.20
The omnipresent threat of litigation may result in
agreements suspect in their effect on competition and their
harmony with patent policy.21 Armed with the imprimatur of the
patent grant, patentees are adept at imposing various forms of
licensing agreements on third parties as well as forming
arrangements between competing patentees through patent
pools. 22 These arrangements often serve a pro-competitive
purpose, but in some instances may hamper competition and
reduce optimal investment in R&D. 23 One may conclude that
these post-grant activities in litigation and licensing suggest that
the current patent system too often reduces incentives to
innovate, while encouraging wasteful duplication of effort. 24
In sum, the patent system creates obstacles for those who
would otherwise contribute to subsequent phases in
technological development.25  In areas of science such as
biotechnology and digital technologies, where innovation is often
evolutionary, incremental, and collaborative, overlapping patents
and threats of litigation impede innovation. 26 Thus, the broad
rights granted to those who contribute to the initial phases of
20. See id.
21. See McFeely, supra note 18, at 290.
22. See Michael A. Lavine, Note, Ripples in the Patent Pool: The Impact and
Implication of the Evolving Essentiality Analysis, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 605, 607
(2008) (explaining how the current essentiality standard and tying could have
anti-competitive effects).
23. Id. at609-10.
24. See McFeely, supra note 18, at 306 (noting that fear of litigation may re-
sult in businesses using resources to ensure that products are litigation proof
instead of using that money toward innovation).
25. See BESSEN &MEURER, supra note 9, at 2-5.
26. Julie E. Cohen & MarkA. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (2001) (explaining issues posed by
the incremental nature of software law). Similar issues that arise in patent in-
dustry also apply to other industries which revolve around sequential innova-
tion. Id.
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invention can obstruct the advancement of subsequent phases of
technological inquiry, thereby reducing the benefits to society as
a basis for future innovation.27
Comprehensive patent reform provides the solution to the
perverse consequences of the current patent system.28 As a
principal mode of reform, there seems to be a general agreement
that, above all, patent quality must be improved.29 In effect,
patents should be more difficult to obtain, resulting in the
issuance of patents that are truly novel and nonobvious.3 0
Unfortunately, we have a one-size-fits-all patent system
irrespective of the technology involved, leading some to suggest
that we modify our patent laws to accommodate the different
fields of technological inquiry.3 1 Proper administration, among
other steps, will necessitate a significant increase in the funds
allocated to the Patent Office.3 2 In addition, enhanced post-grant
procedures to weed out "bad" patents would be an excellent
accompaniment to enhanced examination procedures. 33
Unfortunately, beneficial patent reform in the current
context will probably not take place in the near future. In the
meantime, is there a way to level the judicial playing field? Can
we tailor rules so that they create optimal incentives to inventors
while also tempering side effects of the system which is more
27. See id at 40-42 (deeming the pattern of sequential innovation to be a
risk for infringement litigation).
28. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55
EMORY L.J. 61,123 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of bad patents and the
need to improve the quality of the patent granting process).
29. See id. at 123 (suggesting that the improvement of patent quality would
increase the efficiency of the court process).
30. See id. (proposing an administrative opposition system whereby the
number of "bad" parents surviving without challenge would be reduced).
31. See Peter S. Menell, Patents and Diversity in Innovation Policy Confe-
rence: A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH.TELECOMM. &TECH. L.
REv. 487, 489 (2007) (discussing possible reforms that can be implemented to
settle the surge in patent misuse and litigation).
32. See BESSEN &MEURER, supra note 9, at 223-24.
33. See BESSEN &MEURER, supra note 9, at 223-25.
[Vol. X: No. 2
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crucial in today's technological environment? For this purpose, I
propose a reconsideration of the doctrine of patent misuse, a
defense to patent infringement, in which the patentee has
attempted to enforce his patent contrary to proper contours of
patent policy.
II. What is Patent Misuse?
The origin of patent misuse lies in the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands, "whereby a court of equity will not lend its
support to enforcement of a patent that has been misused."34 The
misuse doctrine is designed to curb practices that generate
"anticompetitive effect" from the patent grant35 Through the
years, courts have found patent misuse in a relatively limited
number of specific acts of the patent owner, often in the context
of patent licensing.3 6 As the CAFC has stated, the fundamental
inquiry is whether, by imposing a challenged condition, the
patent owner has improperly expanded the physical or temporal
scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect 3 7 If the
alleged infringer can demonstrate that the patent owner engaged
in prohibited conduct, the patent is rendered unenforceable
despite its validity.3 8 In this respect, patent misuse is similar to
the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which also results in making
the patent unenforceable.3 9 A defendant claiming patent misuse
is not required to show that he/she was personally harmed by
the misuse.40 This broad interpretation of standing to assert
patent misuse allows any person harmed by the practice to use
34. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
35. See, e.g., Windsurfing Intl Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
36. See, e.g., id. at 995.
37. See id. at 1001 n.8 (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Universi-
ty of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
38. See id. at 1001-02.
39. See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Abusing Intellectual Property Rights in Cyber-
space: Patent Misuse Revisited, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 955,988-89 (2002).
40. See The Harvard Law Review Association, Note, Is the Patent Misuse
Doctrine Obsolete? 110 HARv. L. REv. 1922, 1924 (1997).
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the defense, even despite that person's past transactions with the
patentee. 41 In contrast with contract-based defenses such as
equitable estoppel and implied license, the patent misuse defense
is not restricted to those who had negotiated with the patentee.42
Patent misuse is an elusive doctrine that has waxed and
waned through the years while viewed favorably by some and
reviled by others.43 Despite its checkered history, the doctrine
has been applied as a means to restrain a patent owner's abuse of
a broad patent grant deemed contrary to patent policy.44 In
applying patent misuse, the courts have focused on the
anticompetitive effect resulting from the practice.45 In so doing,
they have naturally gravitated to antitrust law to determine when
the misuse doctrine should be applied.46 As explained below, I
argue that patent misuse should transcend the contours of
traditional antitrust law and should concern itself with policy of
patent law and the effect on innovation. Before I discuss the
interplay of patent misuse and antitrust I would like to provide a
brief historical overview of the doctrine.
III. Patent Misuse: A Ninety Year History
Patent misuse is a court-made doctrine that first appeared
in the 1917 Supreme Court decision known as the Motion Picture
Patents case.47 In that case, the plaintiff owned a patent on a
mechanism for threading film into a movie projector.48 The
patentee licensed the patent covering this mechanism on the
condition that all movie projectors contain a notice precluding
the use of any film not manufactured by the patentee.49 The
41. Id at 1924.
42. Id.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
44. Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, supra note 40, at 1923.
45. Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, supra note 40, at 1925.
46. Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, supra note 40, at 1926.
47. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 502
(1917).
48. Id. at 505.
49. Id. at 506-07.
[Vol. X: No. 2
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Court held that the restriction violated patent policy, by imposing
a license restriction falling outside the scope of the patent 5 0
Despite the pro-competitive focus of the case, the Court based its
decision on the principles of patent policy, nowhere mentioning
the following antitrust law:
A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such
a potential power for evil over an industry, which
must be recognized as an important element in the
amusement life of the nation, under the
conclusions we have stated in this opinion, is
plainly void, because [it is] wholly without the
scope and purpose of our patent laws.. 51
The Motion Picture Patents case not only established the
misuse doctrine as a fixture of patent policy, but it also set the
stage for the doctrine's preoccupation with "extension" of the
patent monopoly in general and tying in particular.5 2 Through
the 1940's the Court made abundant use of the patent misuse
doctrine, striking down a variety of restrictive license
agreements, particularly those that involved tying agreements,
that is linking the sales of one product to another.5 3 Allegations
of patent misuse usually involved either licensing or sale
practices by the patent holder.5 4 The expansion of the patent
misuse doctrine occurred mostly before the 1970's, a time when
the courts held a more critical view of monopolies in general, and
of the rights accrued to inventors in particular.55 This has led
some scholars to contend that the doctrine is an "anachronism"
that can only be explained by the particular jurisprudential
50. Id. at 516.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id. at 516-18.
53. See J. Dianne Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 365-66 (1990) (discussing the patent's bar's sur-
prised reaction to the Supreme Court denying a patentee relief for infringe-
ment based on the patentee's use of tying restrictions).
54. Id at 365-66.
55. Id. at 367-69.
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setting in which it arose, at a time that antitrust was in its
formative years.5 6
The heyday of patent misuse began to wane in the 1980's
and the doctrine was almost terminated in late 1988 by
legislation which prohibited a finding of patent misuse unless the
patentee's practices violated the antitrust laws.5 7 The ultimate
version of this legislation produced a compromise amendment to
the patent law.58 The Patent Misuse Reform Act incorporated the
rule of reason analysis for misuse when the patentee refuses to
license a patent or conditions the license of the patent on the
licensee's purchase of another product.5 9 With this amendment,
drafted in response to persistent criticism of this judge-made
equitable defense to patent infringement, the very existence of
the doctrine of patent misuse-independent of antitrust law-
was viewed as being of questionable validity.60
Even before the passage of the 1988 amendments, the
creation of the CAFC in 1982 diminished the importance of the
patent misuse doctrine. In a series of cases, the CAFC cut back on
the scope of patent misuse, imposing new hurdles on defendants
56. Id. at 360.
57. See Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act, S. Res. 1595 100th
Cong. §438 (1st Sess. 1988); Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged
Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation? 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3, 5 (1989).
58. See Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (amended
2003).
59. See id. § 271(d)(4)-(5). Section 271(d) states: (d) No patent owner oth-
erwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a pa-
tent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following.... (4)
refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license
of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisi-
tion of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in
the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned. Id.
60. See Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuses:
Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 266-67 (1991)
(discussing the misuse doctrine and different restrictions for a license agree-
ment versus a distribution agreement).
[Vol. X: No. 2
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asserting misuse.61 The CAFC limited findings of misuse to
conduct that also had anticompetitive effects. 62 The Federal
Circuit has found misuse on only one occasion,63 while rejecting
the defense in a number of others.64 Whittled away by the CAFC
and directly modified by amendment, the patent misuse doctrine
seemed of dubious validity by the end of the 1980's. Still, the
patent misuse doctrine has been affirmed more than twelve
times by the Supreme Court. Although there has been a general
drift away from the doctrine during the last thirty years, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the Federal Circuit's
ambiguously hostile, yet inconsistent, pronouncements on the
doctrine of patent misuse.65  Even the Federal Circuit has
progressively backed away from its initial negative attitude
toward the defense. 66
61. See, e.g., In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860, 869
(Fed. Cir. 1997); B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories., 124 F.3d 1419,
1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Windsurfing Intl Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
62. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708; Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001-02. Anti-
competitive effects are not "per se violations" but are evaluated according to
the "rule of reason." Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
63. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 664-65 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (find-
ing patent misuse where plaintiff tied licenses on its patented method to leases
of its unpatented machinery).
64. See, e.g., In re Independent, 203 F.3d at 1328; Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at
869; B. Braun Med., 124 F.3d at 1427; Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1002.
65. Cf Sean Michael Aylward, Copyright Law: The Fourth Circuit's Extension
of the Misuse Doctrine to the Area of Copyright A Misuse of the Misuse Doc-
trine?- Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), 17 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 661, 675 (1992) (examining the development of the copyright
misuse doctrine created in Reynolds). "[T]he issue of copyright misuse has
created much confusion and the lower courts remain divided .... Id.
66. See, e.g., Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001-02. The court in Windsurfing,
held that "to sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing arrangement not
held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a factual de-
termination must reveal that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain
competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined market" Id. Since Wind-
surfing, the CAFC seems to have backed off its draconian statement; more re-
cent Federal Circuit cases appear to suggest that the rule of reason analysis
must also include considerations of the policies underlying the patent system.
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The main point of controversy is the relationship between
patent misuse and antitrust law. The doctrine of patent misuse
arose at a time when antitrust principles were in their relative
infancy. Today, by comparison, our understanding of
competition and the role of antitrust is much elaborated, and the
question arises: Is there a continuing need for a misuse doctrine
that, in many ways, overlaps antitrust law? Despite the obvious
overlap between patent misuse and antitrust, I maintain that the
doctrine of patent misuse serves policy goals that differ from
antitrust.
IV. How Misuse Differs from Antitrust
Whether patent misuse should exist independently from
the antitrust inquiry is a question of vigorous debate. As the
above discussion demonstrates, this issue has been
enthusiastically debated on both sides, where Congress and
particularly the Federal Circuit have called into question the
misuse doctrine's independent existence.67 I take the position
that there is a strong rationale to maintain the separate defense
of patent misuse as an alternative to antitrust for reasons of
sound patent law policy. This justification is more pronounced in
the litigation-charged environment in which we live. First, I
would like to briefly outline the certain essential differences
See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700, 708 (stating "[t]he appropriate criterion is
whether Mallinckrodt's restriction is reasonably within the patent grant"); see
also B. Braun Med, 124 F.3d at 1426 (stating "[t]he key inquiry [is whether]
the patentee has 'impermissibly broadened the 'physical or temporal scope' of
the patent grant with anticompetitive effect"' (quoting Windsurfing, 782 F.2d
at 1001-02); Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (implying that the rule of reason
analysis should include factors beyond such a strictly antitrust analysis); C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "[P]atent mi-
suse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation because of the eco-
nomic power that may be derived from the patentee's right to exclude." Id.
67. Cf Ilan Charnelle, TheJustification and Scope of the Copyright Misuse
Doctrine and its Independence of the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167,
167 (2002) (discussing the independent copyright doctrine and its relation to
antitrust law). "Strong debate arises whether it exists independently of the an-
titrust laws or is just a mere extension of the antitrust laws." Id.
[Vol. X: No. 2
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between the antitrust law and the patent misuse doctrine and the
policies underlying each.
At its broadest level, antitrust law seeks to protect
competition and prevent the improper use and creation of
monopolies which result in anticompetitive effects in the
marketplace. The fundamental antitrust test is a balancing test
known as the rule of reason that centers on one issue: the impact
on competition.68 In the practical application of the rule of
reason, the antitrust court looks for market power,
anticompetitive effects, and proof that the anticompetitive effects
outweigh the pro-competitive benefits. 69  These elements,
particularly that of market power, are often so difficult to
establish that some have called the rule of reason a euphemism
for non-liability. 70 In addition, the rule of reason does not
adequately consider how licensing and other practices affect
innovation. 71
By contrast, the patent misuse doctrine has several
attributes that differentiate it from antitrust laws. First, patent
misuse is only available as an affirmative defense to patent
infringement or breach of a license agreement, while federal
antitrust constitutes a federal cause of action.72  Second, a
defendant asserting patent misuse has a significantly less strict
68. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2008). See also
Nat'l Soc'y. of Prof'l Eng'rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). "[T]he Rule does
not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged
restraint that may fall within the realm of reason, instead, it focuses directly on
the challenged restraints impact on competitive conditions." Id. See also Rob-
in Feldman, The Insufficiency ofAntitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 422 (2003). "[A]ntitrust rule of reason focuses on one par-
ticular issue: the impact on competition...." Id.
69. See HOLMES, supra note 68, at § 2:10.
70. See HOLMES, supra note 68, at § 2:10.
71. See HOLMES, supra note 68, at § 2:10.
72. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 902 (8th ed. 2009).
The successful assertion of patent misuse as a defense requires that the al-
leged infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly broadened the phys-
ical or temporal scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect Id.
20101
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standing requirement than antitrust.73 Alternatively, an antitrust
plaintiff must prove antitrust injury to sustain a cause of action.74
Third, the remedy for patent misuse is essentially equitable in
nature.75  Antitrust and patent misuses differ significantly
regarding the nature of available remedies.76 On finding patent
misuse, a court will not enforce the patent against the alleged
infringer.77 Antitrust laws grant treble damages and attorney's
fees in addition to injunctive relief whereas only injunctive, not
monetary, relief is available for the equitable defense of patent
misuse.78
As stated above, the patent misuse doctrine has received
harsh criticism from both commentators and industry groups
which call for its abolishment or argue that it should simply be
folded into antitrust law and deprived of independent doctrinal
significance. 79 Because the misuse doctrine is based on indistinct
principles that overlap antitrust law, it is argued that the misuse
doctrine reduces the incentive to innovate while discouraging
pro-competitive licensing practices that disseminate patented
technology.8 0 The view that patent misuse be made coextensive
73. Id. at902.
74. HOLMES, supra note 68, at § 9:8. "'Antitrust injury'... must be of a type
that the antitrust laws were meant to discourage... [a]nd... the plaintiff's
injury must have been proximately caused by the defendant's antitrust viola-
tion...." HOLMES, supra note 68, at § 9:8.
75. HARMON, supra note 72, at 902.
76. HARMON, supra note 72, at 902.
77. HARMON, supra note 72, at 902.
78. HOLMES, supra note 68, at §§ 9:26-9:29 (discussing the antitrust prin-
ciples governing the recovery of damages and injunctive relief). See also BNA-
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 16.1 (8th ed. 2009) (discussing the availabil-
ity of injunctive relief for patent infringement).
79. William J. Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9
UCLA L. REv. 76 (1962).
80. See generally Byron Bilicki, Standard Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine
of Patent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 209,
235-38 (1984) (discussing the importance of addressing the economic detri-
ments and benefits of patent arrangements prior to inquiring about creativity)
; Richard Stitt, Copyright Self-Help Protection as Copyright Misuse: Finally the
OtherShoe Drops, 57 UMKC L. REV. 899 (1989); Thomas M. Susman, Tying, Re-
fusals to License, and Copyright Misuse: The Patent Misuse Model, 36 J.
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with antitrust law has a logical appeal, given that antitrust law is
a larger and more fully developed body of law than patent
misuse.81 "Applying antitrust rules could provide greater clarity
in patent misuse doctrine and eliminate a source of confusion at
the junction of patent and antitrust law."8 2 The thinking is that
antitrust has evolved a "precise" methodology for determining
when improper market leverage is being used by a patentee. In
comparison, the relatively imprecise "equitable" doctrine of
misuse only adds confusion and uncertainty.8 3 This sentiment
was expressed by Judge Posner who stated that "[i]f misuse
claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by
what principles shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in
alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in
the day to develop one without in the process subjecting the
rights of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty."8 4
V. Why Patent Misuse Should Not Be Coextensive with
Antitrust Law
Those who advocate for the convergence of patent misuse
and antitrust point out that the courts, in applying misuse, have
invariably implicated antitrust principles. But this dependence
has not always been the case, and at its inception misuse did not
take its cue from antitrust s8 5 For example, Robert Merges asserts
that an equitable doctrine preventing unfair extensions of
patents, such as the misuse doctrine, offsets other pro-patentee
doctrines that effectively extend patents, such as the doctrine of
equivalents.8 6 In other words, a doctrine such as patent misuse is
COPYRIGHT LAw SOc'Y 300 (1989).
81. Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
82. Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
83. See Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent
Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 793, 795 (1988).
84. USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983).
85. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942)
(holding license provision that tied purchase of unpatented salt tablets to lease
of a patented machine that used tablets is unenforceable).
86. See Merges, supra note 83, at 793.
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needed to mitigate the inherent tendency of patent owners for
unduly extending the boundaries of their highly exclusionary
governmental grant and would provide a modest means to
leveling the litigation playing field currently skewed in favor of
the patentee.
There are good reasons why patent misuse should not be
made coextensive with antitrust law. Antitrust law is "designed
to address only particular types of harm and it cannot reach
everything that patent policy addresses."8 7 Displacing patent
misuse by antitrust would not take into account fundamental
concerns of patent policy.88 As a basic proposition, patent policy
allows the grant of exclusive rights only under certain
circumstances and only within a limited scope.8 9 Thus, patent
policy is violated when the patentee attempts to expand that
scope and circumvent the limitations of patent law through the
coercive use of a government granted legal right. 90
Antitrust law, however, does not as a matter of course
focus on questions that specifically affect these patent policy
considerations. Rather, antitrust law concentrates on measuring
the acquisition and use of market power.9 1 The rationale is that
lacking market power, a firm is hard put to raise prices or limit
supply, which results in the kind of competitive harm recognized
under antitrust law.92 Thus, where no market power exists,
antitrust is generally unconcerned by other forms of firm
behavior.9 3 This is particularly true for the rule of reason, which
invariably necessitates the finding of market power.9 4 The
87. Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
88. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
89. See Feldman, supra note 69, at 400 (discussing alteration of limits on
time and scope of patents upsets balance of patent system).
90. 1 HEBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS& MARK A LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3-
2b (Supp.2008).
91. Id. at§3.2c.
92. Id.
93. Id.at§3.3a.
94. Id.
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problem is that a patent does not necessarily result in market
power.95 As Robert Merges has stated, "the often very limited (or
thin) markets for patented technology make it difficult to apply
antitrust law's consumer-demand definition of the relevant
market."96 Thus, applying antitrust standards to determine
whether a firm has engaged in behavior that improperly expands
the temporal or physical scope of a patent will only prevent
extensions by firms that have market power.9 7 Patent policy,
however, concerns itself with broader considerations than with
firms that enjoy market power.98
The patent misuse doctrine with its greater scope and
flexibility may produce benefits by providing for increased
judicial scrutiny of patent practices.9 9  Of course equitable
doctrines, like patent misuse, are messy by their very nature.100
However, they do allow for a needed flexibility for judicial
determination.101 Even if a patent owner does enjoy market
power, antitrust still may be inadequate to encompass the broad
array of patent policy concerns. 10 2 Patent policy is involved with
expansions of patent rights that impede system-wide innovation;
even if those expansions do not create the kind of consequences
that the antitrust law takes into account.103 The basic problem is
that antitrust focuses on competition in defined markets and in
so doing tends to disregard, and may even be blind to, activities
that undermine the overall effectiveness of the patent system.104
95. Id.
96. Merges, supra note 83, at 793.
97. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3b.
98. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a.
99. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a (comparing cases to show
the need for flexibility during judicial scrutiny of patent practices).
100. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a.
101. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a.
102. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a.
103. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 90, at § 3.3a.
104. See Carrier, supra note 17, at 1048. Michael Carrier conceptualizes the
tension between patents and antitrust as the patent antitrust paradox. Carrier,
supra note 17, at 1048. 'The patent and antitrust systems promote welfare in
different, often conflicting, ways: the patent system is based on exclusion,
while antitrust law focuses on competition." Carrier, supra note 17, at 1048.
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In contrast to antitrust, patent misuse is not limited by
taking into account what might constitute optimal incentives for
innovation.105 Requiring parties to show antitrust injury would
dramatically restrict judicial inspection of patent practices. 106
"Arguments about innovation are, by necessity, more concerned
with competitor's future actions than with the traditional indicia
of competition-price, output, and quality-because there are
often no products yet to evaluate in considering how a patent
restriction affects innovation."1 0 7  Robin Feldman has
summarized these non-antitrust concerns as: first, prevention of
the economic loss that occurs in defensive research activities in
circumventing a patent; second, a concern with the burden on
innovation caused by an excess of patent rights; and third, the
impediments to innovation resulting from awarding the patent
grant to early-stage inventors to the detriment of late-stage
inventors.10 8 This list of concerns is not exhaustive, but the effect
on innovation should be the focus of patent policy.109 Antitrust
has engaged in analysis of innovation markets but has not had a
particularly good track record in its application.110 It is not hard
to see why. Innovation market definition is a speculative venture
that often defies precision where one is forced to define relevant
assets and close substitutes with limited information.111
It is my conclusion that antitrust law has become too
permissive, enabling those who abuse licensing practices to
escape liability. The reason is that it is exceptionally difficult, if
"Since exclusion-based acts often restrict competition, courts are left to recon-
cile two systems for promoting welfare without any compass to guide them."
Carrier, supra note 17, at 1048.
105. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
106. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
107. See Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, supra note 40, at 1939.
108. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
109. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 400.
110. See Feldman, supra note 68, at 401-02.
111. See Alvin R. Chin, The Misapplication of Innovation Market Analysis to
Biotechnology Mergers, 3 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L 6, 28 (1997) (discussing how de-
fining an innovation market is difficult because of lack of information).
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not impossible, to prove that a patent holder possesses market
power at an early stage in the evolution of a market that the
holder is nonetheless destined ultimately to control.112  In
addition, antitrust is not sensitive to situations where a patent
holder has leveraged its power into neighboring markets and
where those acts would not constitute an antitrust violation, such
as attempted monopolization. 113
So what standard should be applied in determining
whether patent misuse has occurred; that is in assessing an
undue extension of patent rights in order to discourage the
strategic, anticompetitive uses for which patents were not
intended? One might begin with the question of whether the
licensing condition or a practice involving use of a patent on the
balance enhances or suppresses innovation by expanding the
scope and temporal aspects of a patent Most often such
practices will involve the imposition of licensing terms, but also
may encompass various strategic uses of patents that have a
detrimental effect on innovation. 114 Once patent misuse has been
proven, the burden should shift to the patent owner to
demonstrate a business justification for having insisted on the
restrictive licensing practice, or as the case may be, a strategic
use of the patent grant exceeding its scope and contrary to patent
policy.115
With these principles in mind I will now discuss the three
situations in which application of the patent misuse doctrine
would be appropriate. My focus on grant-back licenses, package
licensing, and use of patents in standard settings is a very short
list involving attempts of the patent owners to maximize their
profits. The list is hardly exhaustive but is used to illustrate the
112. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
113. See, e.g., id at 459-60 (holding intent to monopolize not sufficient to jus-
tify finding of "dangerous probability of success" without showing of defen-
dant's economic power in that market).
114. See George Gordon and Robert J. Hoerner, Chapter 1: Overview and His-
torical Development of the Misuse Doctrine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE:
LICENSING AND LITIGATION 29-30 (ABA Sec. of Antitrust Law, 2000).
115. Id.
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kind of issues that merit scrutiny under the doctrine of patent
misuse, a doctrine that should evolve over time to take into
account the ever changing technological landscape as mediated
by the patent system and the efforts of patentees to manipulate
that landscape in their favor.
VI. Grant-Backs, Package Licenses, and Standard Setting
A. Grand-back Clauses
As a condition to a license agreement, a patentee will
sometimes require the licensee to grant it rights to any
"improvement" patents or other new technology that the licensee
develops while using the patented technology.1 16 The imposition
of such a licensing restriction is called a "grant-back."117 Grant-
backs may have, depending on the circumstances, both pro-
competitive and anticompetitive consequences. 118 As to their
pro-competitive effects, grant-backs may allow the licensor and
licensee to share the risks and rewards of subsequent
innovation.1 19 In markets in which standardization is important,
grant-back clauses can increase competition by ensuring that all
licensees of the original patent get the benefit of improvements,
and therefore that the standard is not split by incompatible
changes in subsequent product generations.1 20
"Grant-backs can have pro-competitive effects, especially
if they are nonexclusive."121 "Such arrangements provide a
116. Jay Pil Choi, A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing "Boomerang" Effect and
Grant-Back Clauses, International Economics Review (1999), at 1-2 archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5k86DUGfV.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id.
119. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6, at 30 (1995), archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5fuSwKI7Q [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines].
120. See Choi, supra note 116, at 2 (demonstrating how consideration of fu-
ture competition distorts licensing relationship and how grant-back clause can
mitigate this distortion).
121. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30. See also Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 671-72, 700 (D. S.C. 1977) (holding
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means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and
reward" of their investment in innovation. 122  They also
encourage the licensor to make further innovation based on the
licensed technology.123  In sum, grant-backs may promote
innovation and its dissemination.
Grant-back clauses, however, may adversely affect
competition. For one, they may reduce the licensee's incentive to
engage in research and development thereby limiting rivalry in
innovation markets.124 A licensee who is unable to recoup the
research and development expenses required in developing the
new invention will lose his competitive advantage in the
marketplace. 125 Why should an inventor invest in research and
development if he is insulated by the patent grant to recover
those expenses against those who could free ride on the
invention? Here, I would propose that grant-back licenses should
be scrutinized in their effect on innovation, particularly those
that impose exclusive grant-back licenses.
The exclusivity of a license agreement, particularly a
pattern of exclusive licenses in patent-pooling arrangements
undermines the incentive to innovate even for non-licensees as
well as potential innovators in the same technological field. 126 It
may discourage non-licensees from remaining in the
technological field, much less their continued investment in
mandatory assignment of improvements did not violate antitrust laws, but did
constitute patent misuse), affd, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
122. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30.
123. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30.
124. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30. Grant-back clauses will
be evaluated "under the rule of reason," focusing on "whether the licensor has
market power in a relevant technology or innovation market," whether the
grant-back provision "is likely to reduce significantly licensees' incentives to
invest in improving the licensed technology," and "the extent to which the
grant-back provision has offsetting pro-competitive effects..." See id.
125. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30.
126. See Roger B. Andewelt, Practical Problems in Counseling and Litigating:
Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.I.611, 611-14
(1985); Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 359, 367-72 (1999).
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innovation. 127 This occurs with greater force when the number
of patents in a pool increases. 128 Facing an accumulated set of
pooled patents, and bolstered by exclusive grant-back
agreements, the cost of remaining outside the pool increases with
the omnipresent threat of litigation.129 In sum, grant-backs in a
patent pool context not only create disincentives to innovate by
licensees, they may equally have a negative impact on third
parties in the same technological field and both active
participants and potential innovators who experience increased
barriers to entry.1 30
For this reason, grant-back clauses bear directly on patent
policy and its scrutiny under the doctrine of patent misuse.
Grant-back clauses are often found in the context of patent and
are joined with various other provisions that allow third parties
to join the pool, such as package licensing agreements. 131
Package grant-backs can both have pro-competitive and
anticompetitive results, sometimes encouraging or suppressing
incentives to innovate. 132 As such, package licensing agreements
are appropriate for scrutiny under the doctrine of patent
misuse.133
B. Coercive Package Licensing that Raise Rivals Costs134
A firm with a large patent portfolio can offer to license
patents in a single package, either by requiring a group purchase
or by devising a royalty stream that is not metered by the use of
127. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 29.
128. See Antitrust Guidelines supra note 119, at 29.
129. See Carlson, supra note 126 at 386-87.
130. See Carlson, supra note 126, at 369-72.
131. See Carlson, supra note 126, at 369-72.
132. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 119, at 30.
133. See Webb & Locke, supra note 60, at 265.
134. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents: Impli-
cationsfor Antitrust, (2004), in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US
PERSPECTIVES, at 88-89 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd. (2005), archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5fWeubExU.
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each patent 135 Package patent licensing can produce efficiencies
that could not be achieved through licensing of individual
patents. 136  Alternatively, package licenses may well have
anticompetitive effects and from the perspective of patent policy
may well harm incentives to innovate. 137 A prospective licensee
may not have a need for a license that includes the entire
package, what might be termed a bundle of essential and non-
essential patents, some of which may be of dubious validity.138 "If
the patent holder refuses to license, the competition is faced with
the choice of litigating and/or designing around all of the
patents."1 39 The economic literature has shown that the patent
holder will be able to obtain a license fee for the package that is
greater than it could obtain from licensing patents
individually. 140 And, of course, the very risks of litigation may
command a license fee that does not otherwise accurately reflect
the value of individual patents in the portfolio. 141 A firm with a
large patent portfolio enveloping a competitor's key
technologies-one that could be termed a "patent thicket"-has
the potential to use it to suppress competition in the ultimate
goods market.142 As stated above, patent thickets may encompass
patents of dubious merit.143 Unfortunately, it is costly to innovate
around assertions of infringement.1 44 This creates a situation in
which the costs of innovation are increased simply when the
owner of the patent thicket threatens to assert their patent rights
against the competitor's products or against his customers.1 45
135. See id. at89.
136. See id. at 90.
137. Seeid. at90-91.
138. Seeid. at88.
139. Id. at88.
140. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents:
Implications for Antitrust, (2004), in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND
US PERSPECTIVES, at 90 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., Edward El-
gar Publishing Ltd. (2005), archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5fWeubExU.
141. See id. at 89.
142. See id. at 88.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Daniel L Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of Patents:
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The Supreme Court has held that mandatory package
licensing may constitute patent misuse.146  One important
consideration in the case law is whether the licensee voluntarily
entered into the agreement as a "convenient means for
measuring the value of the license" or whether the licensee has
been coerced. 147 In its most recent treatment of the issue, the
Federal Circuit, in U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade
Commission,148 reversed an International Trade Commission
(ITC) decision, applying an approach of per se illegality to
package licensing.149  In Phillips, the patentee offered non-
exclusive licenses for a package of patents reading on the CD-R
and CD-RW standards, even if the package included patents that
were essential and non-essential to the practice of those
standards. 150 The Federal Circuit held that the ITC's ruling was
not factually supported because the evidence did not show that
there were commercially viable alternatives to the "non-
essential" patents in the package. 151 Thus, it included those
patents that had no anticompetitive effect of foreclosing
competition.152 In addition, the ITC failed to acknowledge the
pro-competitive efficiencies that package licensing may produce
including the reduction of transaction costs in making individual
patent royalty determinations and resolving in advance all
potential patent disputes between the licensor and licensee.1 53
The decision suggests that, in most circumstances,
package licenses will not be invalidated simply because one or
Implications for Antitrust, (2004), in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND
US PERSPECTIVES, at 88 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., Edward El-
gar Publishing Ltd. (2005), archived at
http://www.webcitation.org/5fWeubExU.
146. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Haseltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969).
147. Engel Indus. v. Lockformer, 96 F.3d 1398, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
148. 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1182.
151. Id. at 1198.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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more of the patents included in a package is non-essential.154 But
I do not think that the challenger must show that alternatives to
the non-essential patent exist and that licensees were actually
deterred from using those alternatives. 155 What is pertinent is
whether, on the whole, the package license would tend to have a
negative effect on the incentive to innovate on the part of
competitors.156 Here, in applying patent misuse principles, the
court must take into account both market structure and effect.157
This would require a showing of some degree of effective market
power in the use of those essential patents that make up the
package. 158
C. Standard Setting
My third example where the doctrine of patent misuse is
pertinent occurs in the realm of standard setting arrangements.
Technical standards, such as interface protocols or file formats,
are extremely important in software and other "network
industries."1 59 In the end, consumer market standards that
ensure the interoperability of products facilitate the sharing of
information among purchasers of products from competing
manufacturers, thereby enhancing the utility of all products. 160
Thus, patent law policy should encourage the development of
reliable open standards while retaining incentives for
innovation. 161
When parties in standard setting organizations participate
in good faith the organization can make rational decisions about
costs and benefits before an industry comes locked into a
154. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1179, 1198 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
155. See id. at 1198-1199.
156. Idat1198.
157. Id.
158. Idat1187.
159. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Or-
ganizations, 90 CAL. L REV. 1889, 1896 (2002).
160. See id. at 1896.
161. Seeid. at1962.
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standard.162 Under certain circumstances, the assertion of patent
rights against established industry standards can seriously
disrupt these beneficial arrangements in two situations.163 First,
a patentee may encourage the adoption of standard related
patents by offering them royalty free only to enforce its patents
against adopters when the standard has gone into extensive
use. 164 In the second situation, which could be termed "patent
hold-up," a standard setting organization completes its lengthy
process of evaluating technologies and adopting a new standard,
only to discover that certain technologies essential to
implementing the standard are patented.165 To avoid patent
hold-up, standard-setting organizations often have rules
requiring participants to disclose patents related to technologies
under consideration for the standard.166 But sometimes, as in
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,167 patentees may hide the
existence of patents in order to assert them against industry
members who became locked into the standards to extract
increased royalties.168 Deception such as these in a consensus
driven private standard-setting environment harms the
competitive process. 169
In this setting, the application of patent misuse doctrine,
rendering the misused patent unenforceable, is particularly
apposite given the problems of proving antitrust injury under the
antitrust laws. Robert Merges and Jeffrey Khun have argued that
patent misuse is not entirely suitable to remedy abusive practices
by patentees in the standard-setting context.170 They point out
that patent misuse has been traditionally applied in cases of
"antitrust-like" abuses in licensing, often involving instances of
162. See id. at 1898-1901.
163. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Khun, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented
Standards, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1, 1 (2009) (identifying the bait and switch strategy).
164. Id. at 1.
165. Id. at 10, 14-15.
166. Id. at 11-12.
167. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2007).
168. See id. at 318.
169. See Merges & Khun, supra note 163, at 11.
170. See Merges & Khun, supra note 163, at 38.
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market power and in tying arrangements.1 71 As an alternative,
they propose the use of a standards estoppels doctrine to fill the
gap. 172 The merits of their position could be argued but what
they propose is a subset of patent misuse. No matter what you
call it-patent misuse or standards estoppels-the beneficial
result is much the same.
VII. Conclusion
Because a patent is a privilege which is conditioned by the
public purpose of promoting innovation,17 3 courts should retain
at least some form of the patent misuse doctrine. It is one tool
that courts use to maximize net social welfare by invalidating
inefficient restrictions through which patent holders earn
rewards that are incommensurate with the patent grant and
suppress technological progress. Of course, no one doctrine is a
panacea. But we need a method that is able to evaluate various
licensing techniques and other uses of the patent grant that abuse
the patent system by expanding the scope and temporal aspects
of governmental conferred monopoly contrary to patent policy.
As novel techniques emerge, particularly in the areas of patent
accumulation and licensing, there is a need for a broad equitable
doctrine-one that can evolve with the times-to curtail forms of
patentee behavior that abuse the patent system and have a
detrimental effect on innovation.
171. See Merges & Khun, supra note 163, at 38.
172. Merges & Khun, supra note 163, at 38.
173. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
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